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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

29 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :  
The Transition of Front Troops to the  
Offensive with the Simultaneous Repulse  
of the Enemy Invasion

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson describing a conventionally-armed NATO air strike and ground invasion of East Germany and the actions taken and proposals made by a Soviet front commander, his army commanders, and important staff officers to repulse this invasion and initiate offensive actions in the northern part of West Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 20b: The Transition  
of Front Troops to the Offensive with the Simultaneous  
Repulse of the Enemy Invasion

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students in the role of front and army commanders and some important staff officers proposing the actions their troops are to take to repulse a conventionally-armed NATO massed air strike and ground invasion of East Germany and initiate offensive operations in NATO's Northern Army Group area. The composition, locations, time scheduling, and targets of NATO air and ground attack groupings are set forth in some detail, as are the front's efforts to repulse them with motorized rifle, tank, and artillery units, antitank means, and air and helicopter strikes. Also discussed are the NATO areas for crossings and breakthroughs, Lance and Pershing missile strength, and atomic artillery resources. Revealed are the front's strength, disposition, axes of attack, air power, and antitank capabilities. In repulsing NATO's initial air strike and ground invasion, the front's covering troops suffer extremely low losses in personnel and materiel.

End of Summary


Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany  
Blue -- Great Britain

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LESSON 20b

I. LESSON SUBJECT: "The transition of front troops to the offensive with the simultaneous repulse of the enemy invasion"

II. ESTIMATED TIME TO COMPLETE THE LESSON

Lesson title	Time allocated (hours)		Total
	Group training period	Individual study by students	
"The repulse of the enemy invasion and the transition of <u>front</u> troops to the offensive"	4	6	10

III. TRAINING OBJECTIVES OF THE LESSON:

- to teach the students to make a comprehensive estimate of the situation under conditions of an enemy air and ground invasion;
- to provide the students with actual practice in making a decision on the repulse of the enemy invasion with the simultaneous transition of front troops to the offensive;
- to examine the capabilities of the troops to repulse the enemy invasion when only conventional means of destruction are employed in combat actions.

IV. METHOD OF CONDUCTING THE LESSON -- group exercise with elements of a /war/ game.

V. METHODOLOGICAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE STUDENTS' PREPARATION FOR THE LESSON

Prior to the start of the students' individual study the

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lesson director will recommend that they:

- study sections 1, 2, and 3 of Chapter IV of the textbook Front Offensive Operations and the assignment with the situation map for 0800 hours 8 September;
- calculate the capabilities of the 4th Army troops for repulsing the enemy's invasion on the axis of his attack when only conventional means of destruction are employed in conducting combat actions.

VI. PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING THE LESSON:

1. Critique of theoretical matters relating to the lesson subject -- 10 minutes.
2. Estimate of the situation -- 120 minutes.
  - a) Assessment of the enemy -- 25 minutes.

In the role of the chief of the intelligence directorate of the front staff, the students will report the conclusions of the assessment of the enemy:

- the general characteristics of the enemy's grouping and actions in the Coastal Front area at 0800 hours 8 September;
- the composition of the enemy's attack groupings and the main axes of their actions;
- the enemy's probable intentions regarding the further conduct of combat actions;
- the most important tasks and the axes of concentration of the main efforts of front reconnaissance.

REPORT  
OF THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE  
FRONT STAFF ON THE SITUATION AT 0800 HOURS 8 SEPTEMBER

In the first days of September the enemy completed preparations to unleash military actions and on the night of 8 to 9 September concentrated three attack groupings in the areas east of HAMBURG, southeast of LUNEBURG, and east of HANNOVER, with which, following a brief artillery preparation and concurrently with massed air strikes, he made the transition to the offensive

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at 0700 hours for the purpose of destroying the covering units, defeating the first-echelon troops of the Coastal Front and developing an attack on BERLIN. With respect to what had been anticipated earlier, no significant changes in the enemy grouping were discovered.

According to data from all types of reconnaissance, in the front zone the enemy has deployed up to seven divisions on the HAMBURG-NEUSTADT axis and up to seven to eight divisions on the HANNOVER-BERLIN axis.

At 0800 hours 8 September the enemy troops had invaded: the area of the 4th Army -- with units of two divisions of the Brown 6th Army Corps; the area of the 7th Army -- with the forward units of two divisions of the Brown 4th Army Corps and up to one division of the Brown 1st Army Corps; and the area of the 9th Army -- with the forward units of one division of the Brown 1st Army Corps and of two divisions of the Blue 1st Army Corps.

Moreover, a bunching up of troops is being observed in the areas southeast of NEUMUNSTER, in the forests west of CELLE, and southwest of HANNOVER -- up to one division in each area, and up to an army corps north of BREMEN.

Altogether in the enemy's first echelon up to five Brown and Blue tank (armored) divisions and up to six Brown and Blue motorized infantry divisions are being observed, as well as up to five to six divisions in the second echelon.

Operational-tactical nuclear attack means have been deployed in the following siting areas: Lance missile battalions -- 20 km northeast of HAMBURG, 10 km northwest of LUCHOW, 28 km southeast of CELLE, and 3 km south of BRAUNSCHWEIG; and a Pershing missile squadron -- in the area of MELLE.

The operational disposition of the enemy's troops and the areas that his forward units have invaded indicate that the advance of the attack groupings should be expected on three axes: HAMBURG, PARCHIM; LUCHOW, NEUSTADT; and HANNOVER, MAGDEBURG. In the first echelon of the attack groupings on these axes the following have been deployed:

-- HAMBURG-PARCHIM, up to two divisions of the Brown 6th

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Army Corps (6th and 13th motorized infantry divisions), six operational-tactical missile launchers, eight tactical missile launchers, up to 550 tanks, and up to 370 guns and mortars, as many as 36 of which are atomic artillery pieces;

-- LUCHOW-NEUSTADT, up to two divisions of the Brown 4th Army Corps (15th Motorized Infantry Division and the 16th Tank Division), six operational-tactical missile launchers, eight tactical missile launchers, up to 570 tanks, up to 300 guns and mortars, 36 of which are atomic artillery pieces, and up to 200 antitank means;

-- HANNOVER-MAGDEBURG, up to two tank divisions of the Brown 1st Army Corps (3rd and 7th tank divisions) and two armored divisions of the Blue 1st Army Corps (1st and 2nd armored divisions), eighteen operational-tactical missile launchers, eight tactical missile launchers; 1,120 tanks; 530 guns and mortars, as many as 68 of which are atomic artillery pieces, and up to 540 antitank means.

The buildup to the attack force is possible upon the arrival of the attack groupings at the SCHWERIN, ELBE River line by committing to battle additional forces from the second echelons (reserves). Accordingly, the groupings for the axes of the attacks will contain:

-- HAMBURG-PARCHIM, up to three divisions of the Brown 6th Army Corps (6th, 13th, and 21st motorized infantry divisions), six operational-tactical missile launchers, 12 tactical missile launchers, up to 840 tanks, up to 500 guns and mortars, as many as 48 of which are atomic artillery pieces, and up to 300 to 330 antitank means;

-- LUCHOW-NEUSTADT -- no changes;

-- HANNOVER-MAGDEBURG, up to three divisions of the Brown 1st Army Corps (3rd and 7th tank divisions and the 11th Motorized Infantry Division) and the Blue 1st Army Corps (1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions), 18 operational-tactical missile launchers, 12 tactical missile launchers; up to 1,600 tanks; up to 770 guns and mortars, as many as 98 of which are atomic artillery pieces; and up to 530 antitank means.

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The enemy's most powerful grouping is located on the HANNOVER-BERLIN axis. Repulsing the invasion of this grouping will establish the necessary conditions for the Coastal Front troops to successfully conduct an offensive and destroy in detail the opposing enemy.

In view of this, concentrate the main efforts of reconnaissance on the HANNOVER axis and, with all types of it /reconnaissance/, ascertain the siting areas of the enemy's nuclear attack means and their readiness to deliver a nuclear strike; define precisely the composition of the enemy attack groupings; ascertain in good time the approach of the reserves and second echelons and the axes of their commitment to battle.

b) Assessment of one's own troops -- 95 minutes.

The students, in the role of the commanders of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies and of the 1st Air Army, of the chief of the air defense troops, and the front chief of staff, are to report the conclusions of an assessment of their own troops and proposals for a decision on the situation as of 0800 hours 8 September:

The commanders of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies /are to report on/:

- the operational disposition and condition of the army troops;
- the capabilities of the troops to repulse the enemy invasion on the HAMBURG-PARCHIM axis when only conventional means of destruction are employed in carrying out combat operations (only for the 4th Army);
- the composition of the enemy's groupings on his invasion axes and the probable nature of the actions;
- the decision on repulsing the invasion and the transition of the army to the offensive.

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 4th ARMY -- 20 minutes

1. By 0500 hours the 4th Army completed preparations for the offensive operation, but at 0700 hours 8 September the enemy subjected it to a massed air strike. The most powerful strike was delivered against the covering units of the 8th Motorized

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Rifle Division, the air defense means, and the army rocket troops.

At the same time army covering units were attacked on the PARRENTIN /sic -- ZARRENTIN/ line, (excluding) LAUENBURG, by enemy ground forces that had gone over to the offensive from the area east of HAMBURG.

By 0800 hours 8 September the army troops are occupying the following position:

-- the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division has begun a movement with its main forces out of the departure area for the offensive. With its main forces the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment is holding the covering line it occupied earlier, and with part of its forces, in cooperation with the 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment, it is successfully advancing to bypass /y obkhod/ LUBECK from the south; the 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment -- the division's forward detachment -- has crossed the state border and, successfully advancing, is engaged in battle on the line of the southern outskirts of LUBECK, WULFSDORF, reference point 33;

-- the 7th Motorized Rifle Division, having repulsed the invasion attempts of the enemy's reconnaissance subunits, has crossed the state border with part of the forces of the 22nd and 21st motorized rifle regiments and has advanced into enemy territory to a depth of from 2 to 4 km. The division's main forces are in movement from 10 to 16 km from the state border;

-- the 8th Motorized Rifle Division is implementing measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's massed air strike. The 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment, having repulsed the attacks of the enemy's forward subunits, is firmly holding the cover sector along the border. Having occupied the cover line on the division's left flank along the MYULEN /probably MOLLN/ River, the 1st Battalion of the 25th Motorized Rifle Regiment, under attack by the superior tank and motorized infantry forces of the Brown 6th Motorized Infantry Division, withdrew 2 km and, finding itself half encircled, is engaged in heavy fighting northwest of BOIZENBURG with the invading enemy;

-- the 14th Motorized Rifle Division, with its covering units (the 42nd and 44th motorized rifle regiments), is holding the ELBE River line. The 42nd Motorized Rifle Regiment is engaged in battle with the forward units of the Brown 14th Motorized Infantry Division, which at 0710 hours began the

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assault crossing of the ELBE River on a front 2 km north of BLECKEDE, HITZACKER. By 0800 hours the forward subunits of the 14th Motorized Infantry Division, after making an assault crossing of the ELBE River, seized the bridgeheads: (excluding) BANDEKOW, (excluding) WEYDISHTUN /probably NEUWENDISCHTHUN/; and in the area of NEY-GARTE /sic -- NEU-GARGE/;

-- the 2nd Tank Division is in its disposition area, eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's air strike;  
-- the rocket troops and air defense troops of the army are in the siting areas.

According to preliminary data, as a result of the massed air strike and in the course of repulsing the enemy invasion, the army covering units have lost about two to three percent of their personnel and combat equipment.

At 0800 hours 8 September, the covering units of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division (24th and 25th motorized rifle regiments) have about 54 individual items of antitank means (not counting RPG-7's /antitank rocket launchers/ and tanks). With an effectiveness factor of "2" for antitank means in combat with advancing enemy tanks, the covering troops can destroy up to 110 enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers; and when the division's antitank reserves (12 antitank guns and 9 antitank guided missiles) and the tanks of two motorized rifle regiments are taken into account (allowing for losses of around 75 tanks) -- as many as 200 to 210 items of armor /can be destroyed/.

2. The enemy, having concentrated the main grouping of troops from the Brown 6th Army Corps in the area of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division, after a brief artillery preparation at 0700 hours, and simultaneously with a massed air strike, went over to the offensive on the HAMBURG, PARCHIM axis for the purpose of destroying the covering units, defeating the troops of the army's first echelon, and together with the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps, throwing the latter back on the SCHWERIN, WITTENBERGE line; and subsequently developing an attack on BERLIN. In so doing the enemy has deployed against the 8th Motorized Rifle Division in the area of MOLLN, AHRENSBURG, and LAUENBURG up to two Brown motorized infantry divisions in the first echelon (13th and 6th motorized infantry divisions), which contain 14 tactical and operational-tactical rocket launchers, up to 30 to 36 atomic artillery pieces, approximately 500 to 550

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tanks, more than 350 guns and mortars, and more than 200 individual items of antitank means. Consequently the covering units of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division (the 24th and 25th motorized rifle regiments) are unable to hold the line with their own forces.

A buildup of the enemy attack force is possible through a commitment to battle of fresh forces from the second echelon of the 6th Army Corps, in whose complement there is at least one division in the area of NEUMUNSTER, BAD-BRAMSTEDT, and BAD-SEGEBERG; in so doing the enemy will have up to 840 tanks and 300 antitank means. When all of the forces and means of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division (up to 200 antitank means and up to 210 tanks) are taken into consideration, it can destroy up to 400 to 450 individual items of enemy armor. The availability to the enemy of up to 800 to 850 tanks gives rise to the threat of an enemy breakthrough in the area of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division. Provision must be made to reinforce the 8th Motorized Rifle Division /from the/ army antitank reserve (4th Army Antitank Artillery Regiment -- 63 antitank items) and to deploy in the area of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division the front antitank reserve (4th Antitank Artillery Brigade -- 108 antitank items). This totals 171 antitank means, which provides the capability to repulse the advance of 750 to 800 tanks (400 to 450 by the 8th Motorized Rifle Division and 340 to 350 by the army and front antitank reserves).

3. I decided that: the advancing enemy is to be defeated and his invasion repulsed on the HAMBURG, PARCHIM axis through a solid defense by the forces of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division, reinforced with the army antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachment, and by part of the forces of the 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment. At the same time, the first-echelon large units of the Brown 6th Army Corps are to be destroyed by the decisive offensive of the main grouping of army troops -- the 3rd and 7th motorized rifle divisions -- on the BAD OLDESLOE, NEUMUNSTER axis and of part of the forces of the 7th Motorized Rifle Division on the RATZEBURG, AHRENSBURG /axis/; and by the close of 8 September the following line is to be seized: GLESCHEENDORF, BAD SEGEBERG, (excluding) ARANSBURG /sic -- AHRENSBURG/.

I request that: provision be made for deploying front antitank reserve No. 1 on the HAMBURG, PARCHIM axis -- in the

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area of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division.

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 7th ARMY -- 15 minutes

1. By 0430 hours the 7th Army had occupied the departure area in preparation for a transition to the offensive. At 0700 hours the enemy subjected the army troops to a massed air strike. The most intensive strike was delivered against the covering units, the air defense means, and the rocket troops.

Immediately following the massed air strike the enemy, after intruding across the GDR state border in a number of sectors, attacked the covering units of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division and the 5th Tank Division after a brief artillery preparation.

As of 0800 hours 8 September the army troops are occupying the following position:

-- the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, with the forces of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th motorized rifle regiments, is repelling the attacks of the invading forward units of the 16th Tank Division and 15th Motorized Infantry Division of the Brown 4th Army Corps on the line of SCHNACKENBURG, ZIEMENDORF, SALZWEDEL, (excluding) DAHRENDORF;

-- the 4th Motorized Rifle Division began a movement out of the departure area for the offensive with its main forces toward the state border while simultaneously eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy air strike. The 12th Motorized Rifle Regiment, with part of its forces, is repulsing the enemy attacks; and with its main forces in cooperation with the forward detachment of the division, the 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment, it has crossed the state border and is engaged in battle with covering subunits of the Brown 1st Motorized Infantry Division;

-- the 5th Tank Division, with the forces of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 5th Motorized Rifle Regiment providing cover, is engaged in an intense battle with the forward units of the Brown 3rd Tank Division; the rest of the forces have begun to move out toward the state border while simultaneously eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's massed air strike in the departure area for the offensive. The forward detachment of the division, the 16th Tank Regiment, has crossed the state border and is engaged in battle with the 2nd /?Regiment/ of the 8th Tank

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Brigade on the TULAU, PARSAU line;

-- the 9th Tank Division and the 11th Motorized Rifle Division are in the disposition areas, eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy air strike.

According to preliminary data, as a result of the massed air strike and in the course of repulsing the enemy's forward units, the army covering troops have lost approximately three percent of their personnel and combat equipment.

2. The enemy, having concentrated in the first echelon up to two Brown tank divisions and two Brown motorized infantry divisions facing the 7th Army's front, at 0700 hours concurrently with a massed air strike went over to the offensive on the LUCHOW, NEUSTADT axis with the forces of the 16th Tank Division and 15th Motorized Infantry Division of the Brown 4th Army Corps, and on the HANNOVER, MAGDEBURG axis with the 3rd Tank Division of the Brown 1st Army Corps for the purpose of destroying the covering units, defeating the army's first echelon troops, seizing the city of MAGDEBURG, making an assault crossing from the march of the ELBE River, and subsequently developing a thrust on BERLIN from the southwest. The boundary between the attack groupings is being covered by the forces of the 1st Motorized Infantry Division of the Brown 1st Army Corps.

The 3rd Tank Division, which has in its complement from four to six tactical missile launchers, approximately 15 atomic artillery pieces, approximately 300 tanks, and approximately 150 guns and mortars, was deployed in the area of the army by itself out of the grouping operating on the main attack axis HANNOVER, MAGDEBURG.

During the offensive a buildup of the enemy attack force is possible following the assault crossing of the ELBE River by the commitment to battle of fresh forces from the reserve, which is made up of one motorized infantry division concentrated in the area west of CELLE.

I decided that: the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps that had invaded are to be defeated through a solid defense by the 1st Motorized Rifle Division on the right flank of the army's offensive zone, by the fire of artillery and antitank means, and the strikes of fire support helicopters; at the same time the

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main forces of the enemy attack grouping are to be destroyed by the transition to a decisive offensive of the army's main forces in the general direction of CELLE and by a meeting attack in cooperation with the 9th Army troops; and by the close of 8 September the UELZEN, ESCHUDE, WATHLINGEN line is to be seized.

The 9th Tank Division is to be committed to battle on the morning of 9 September to defeat the enemy reserves and to develop an attack on the CELLE, NIENBURG axis.

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 9th ARMY -- 15 minutes

1. By 0500 hours the 9th Army had occupied the departure area in preparation for the transition to the offensive.

At 0700 hours the enemy subjected the army troops to a massed air strike. The most intensive strike was directed at the covering units of the 18th and 21st motorized rifle divisions, the air defense means, and the rocket troops.

Immediately following the air strike and after a brief artillery preparation the enemy crossed the state border with his forward units and engaged in battle with the covering units.

As of 0800 hours the army troops are occupying the following position:

The 10th Tank Division, with the forces of the 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment providing cover, is engaged in battle with the forward subunits of the 3rd Tank Division and 7th Tank division of the Brown 1st Army Corps on the flanks of the division's offensive zone 3 to 5 km from the state border;

-- in the center of the zone, the forward detachment of the division, the 30th Tank Regiment, has crossed the state border and is engaged in battle on the RUHEN line, 2 km west of GRAFHORST;

-- the division's main forces are in movement, with the heads of the columns 10 to 15 km from the state border.

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The 18th Motorized Rifle Division, with the forces of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment, is engaged in heavy fighting with the forward units of the Brown 7th Tank Division;

-- the forward detachment of the division, the 55th Motorized Rifle Regiment, with its first battalion has arrived at the state border in the ZEGG RDEADEREN /sic -- probably SEGGERDE, DOHREN/ sector;

-- the division's main forces are in movement 15 to 20 km from the state border.

The 21st Motorized Rifle Division with its covering units, the 63rd and 64th motorized rifle regiments, is engaged in heavy defensive fighting with the forward units of the 1st Armored Division of the Blue 1st Army Corps; the 64th Motorized Rifle Regiment has been driven back 1.5 to 2 km from the positions it had been occupying;

-- part of the forces of the 63rd Motorized Rifle Regiment have crossed the state border and are engaged in battle on the MARNENTAL /sic -- MARIENTAL/ line, the northern outskirts of HELMSTADT;

-- the main forces of the division are in movement 12 to 15 km from the state border.

The 23rd Motorized Rifle Division, with the forces of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 69th Motorized Rifle Regiment, is engaged in heavy defensive fighting with the forward units of the 2nd Armored Division of the Blue 1st Army Corps on the line (excluding) BARNEBERG, WACKERSLEBEN, GUKSLEBEN /sic -- GUNSLEBEN/; with the forces of the 2nd Battalion of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division it is holding the cover line DEDELEBEN, RHODEN, RIMBECK;

-- the forward detachment of the division, the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment, is in movement on the HORNHAUSEN, WULFERSTEDT line;

-- the division's main forces are in movement 20 to 25 km from the state border.

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The 26th Tank Division and the 6th Motorized Rifle Division are eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy air strike in the disposition areas;

-- the covering units of the first-echelon large units have incurred losses of up to three to five percent.

2. The enemy had concentrated up to three Brown and Blue tank divisions (armored divisions) in the area of the army's first echelon and at 0700 hours, concurrently with a massed air strike that immediately followed a brief artillery preparation, went over to the offensive on the HANNOVER-MAGDEBURG axis with the forward units of the 7th Tank Division of the Brown 1st Army Corps and the 1st and 2nd armored divisions of the Blue 1st Army Corps, which contain in their complement up to 20 to 25 tactical and operational-tactical missile launchers, up to 70 atomic artillery pieces, more than 800 tanks, and over 400 guns and mortars.

During the offensive, with the taking of MAGDEBURG and the assault crossing of the ELBE River, a buildup of the attack force on this axis is possible by committing to battle the second echelon of the Blue 1st Army Corps (the 4th Armored Division), which is presently concentrated south of HANNOVER.

I decided that: the enemy's attack grouping is to be defeated through a solid defense by the 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions on the left flank of the army's offensive zone, by the fire of artillery and antitank means, and the strikes of fire support helicopters; and it is not to be allowed to advance into the area of MAGDEBURG nor to make an assault crossing of the ELBE River; at the same time the army's main forces are to destroy the opposing forces of the Brown 1st Army Corps through a head-on attack on the WOLFSBURG, LEHRTE axis in cooperation with the 7th Army, and by the close of 8 September they are to seize the line (excluding) WATHLINGEN, PEINE, BRAUNSCHWEIG, in readiness to develop the offensive on the BRAUNSCHWEIG, MINDEN axis.

I request that provision be made for the deployment of front antitank reserve No. 2 on the MAGDEBURG axis.

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REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 2nd /sic/ AIR ARMY --  
10 minutes

- the disposition and condition of the air army;
- proposals on the conduct of combat actions by the air army large units and units for the repulse of the enemy invasion and the transition to the offensive.

Contents of the report

1. The 1st Air Army, with its fighter aviation and in cooperation with the air defense troops of the front and the country, has been repulsing the massed raids of enemy aviation since 0700 hours 8 September; with its bomber and fighter-bomber aviation it is fulfilling tasks according to the plan of the air operation. The air army's helicopters are supporting the combat actions of the forward detachments and covering troops.

The runways on airfields Nos. 242, 245, and 256 have been put out of operation.

2. I propose:

- as of 1000 hours, to concentrate the efforts of fighter-bomber aviation on supporting the troops of the 7th and 9th armies, according to the readiness of the army's main forces;
- as of 1100 hours, to direct the main forces of the bomber aviation toward the destruction of the enemy's operational-tactical missile/nuclear means, aircraft on airfields, and reserves, according to reconnaissance data;
- to continue to destroy enemy tanks and fire means with the forces of the fire support helicopters;
- to deliver a second massed strike with the army's main forces in the second half of the day, in accordance with the plan of the air operation.

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE FRONT AIR DEFENSE TROOPS --  
10 minutes

- conclusions from an evaluation of the air situation;
- condition of the front and armies' air defense system.

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Contents of the report:

(Based on the data in Lesson No. 20a)

1. From 0700 to 0740 hours 8 September the front air defense troops, in cooperation with the fighter aviation of the 1st Air Army and the 6th Air Defense Corps, repulsed the initial massed strike of the air enemy. Enemy aviation delivered a strike from the northwest and west axes with two echelons together totalling up to 500 combat aircraft. Since 0740 hours 8 September the air enemy has been carrying out intensive combat actions with groupings containing four, six, or twelve aircraft each.

The second massed air strike should be expected in four to five hours by approximately 1200 hours 8 September.

The air defense troops destroyed 52 enemy aircraft in repulsing the initial massed strike. According to preliminary data, the front air defense troops have lost: 10 surface-to-air missile batteries, seven antiaircraft artillery batteries, and three radar companies.

2. The front and armies' air defense system has not been disrupted. The air defense troops are combat-effective and continue to fulfill assigned tasks in the original grouping. The losses that have been incurred will be restored within 24 hours by drawing on reserves on hand in the air defense troops and in the army and front depots.

REPORT OF THE FRONT CHIEF OF STAFF -- 20 minutes

-- the operational disposition and condition of front troops;

-- the proposals regarding the decision on the repulse of the enemy invasion and the transition of front troops to the offensive.

Contents of the report:

1. The Coastal Front, with the forces of the 1st Air Army together with long-range aviation and the aviation of the

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Combined Baltic Fleet, is fulfilling the tasks of the air operation and simultaneously repulsing the enemy's air strikes and the attacks of the enemy's ground force groupings that have gone over to the offensive.

With their forward units (detachments), the first-echelon large units have crossed the state border and are successfully attacking on the LUBECK and HANNOVER axes.

On the HAMBURG-LUDWIGSLUST, LUCHOW-STENDAL, and SALZGITTER-MAGDEBURG axes the covering troops and first-echelon large units, supported by fighter-bomber aviation and combat helicopters, are engaged in intense battles to repulse the invading enemy.

At 0800 hours 8 September the units and large units on these axes are firmly holding the occupied sectors and defense zones. They have lost two to three percent of their personnel and combat equipment as a result of enemy air strikes and artillery fire and therefore retain their stability. For this they have /the following/ in their complement (see table on page 20).

With an effectiveness factor of "2" in combat with attacking enemy tanks, this number of antitank means in the line units that are on the defense on the axes of the enemy attacks makes it possible for them to conduct a successful battle against more than 2,300 tanks; and when fire support helicopters (80) and tanks (830) are taken into account, to repulse the attack of not only the enemy's forward units but also of his first-echelon divisions.

The large units in the attack groupings of front troops are moving out of the departure areas toward the state border.

The Combined Baltic Fleet is carrying out combat actions to defeat Carrier Strike Group /task force/ 401,2 and the convoys in the North Sea and to gain supremacy in the Baltic Sea; at 0715 hours it delivered air strikes against the Brown Tactical Air Command in the southern part of the JUTLAND peninsula; in an hour it will begin an artillery preparation /against/ the amphibious landing areas on FEHMARN Island.

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	AT guns	AT guided missiles	AT grenade launchers (SPG-9)	Total AT means	Additional tanks
4th Army 8th MtzR Div, army and front antitank /AT/ Reserves	120	243	12	375	214
7th Army 1st MtzR Div, army AT reserve	48	207	12	267	214
9th Army 21st and 23rd MtzR Divs, army and front AT reserves	132	423	24	579	428
Total	300	873	48	1,221	856
Allowing for losses of three percent	291	847	46	1,184	830

From the left the Western Front with its covering troops is successfully repulsing the attack of the enemy's forward units, and its main forces are moving out of the departure areas for the offensive.

Thus, the operational disposition and condition of the front troops as well as the disposition of adjacent forces will make possible the simultaneous repulse of the enemy's offensive on the axes of his invasion by the covering units and large units and the transition to a decisive offensive by the main forces of the front attack groupings in accordance with the decision adopted.

I propose that: the enemy's forward units that are advancing are to be defeated and their invasion repulsed through a firm defense by the covering units and large units, the fire of artillery and antitank means, and strikes by fighter-bombers and fire support helicopters. In the event that the enemy develops

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an offensive on the axes of his invasion, the air defense of the covering troops is to be reinforced by drawing on the reserves of the front and armies.

The front attack groupings are to go over to the offensive in accordance with the decision adopted for the operation, the enemy is to be defeated in a meeting engagement, and the following line is to be seized by the close of 8 September:

/by/ the 4th Army -- GLESCENDORF, BAD-SEGEBERG, (excluding) AHRENSBURG;  
/by/ the 7th Army -- UELZEN, ESCHEDA, WATHLINGEN;  
/by/ the 9th Army -- (excluding) WATHLINGEN, PEINE, BRAUNSCHWEIG.

The transition of the troops to the offensive is to be implemented at 0900 hours by the first-echelon divisions /as they move/ through the battle formations of the covering units.

The offensive of the troops is to be supported by part of the forces of the fighter-bomber aviation. The efforts of the 6th Bomber Division are to be concentrated on the destruction of the enemy's operational-tactical nuclear means, aircraft on airfields, and reserves.

The group of transmitters at the communications center of the front command post and the disrupted radio and radio-relay communications with the command post of the 9th Army are to be restored by 1000 hours 8 September by drawing upon and using /communications/ reserves.

3. The decision on the repulse of the enemy invasion and the transition of front troops to the offensive -- 40 minutes.

Students in the role of front commander are to report the decision on the repulse of the enemy invasion and the transition of front troops to the offensive:

- brief conclusions on the enemy's grouping in the front zone, the nature of his actions, and the disposition of front troops;
- the concept of the decision on the repulse of the enemy

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invasion and the transition of front troops to the offensive;  
-- the tasks for the troops;  
-- the organization of control.

REPORT  
OF THE DECISION OF THE COASTAL FRONT COMMANDER  
ON THE SITUATION AT 0800 HOURS 8 SEPTEMBER

1. At 0700 hours 8 September the enemy -- the Northern Army Group -- having concentrated up to 17 to 18 divisions in the Coastal Front area, 12 of them in the first echelon, after a brief artillery preparation and simultaneously with a massed air strike went over to the offensive on three main axes: HAMBURG, PARCHIM; LUCHOW, NEUSTADT; and HANNOVER, MAGDEBURG.

The purpose of the offensive is to destroy the covering units, defeat the front's first-echelon troops, and advance to the SCHWERIN, ELBE River line. Subsequently, with the commitment to battle of up to five to six divisions from the reserve, /the purpose is/ to develop the offensive on BERLIN and seize the capital of the German Democratic Republic.

In the event that the achievement of this assigned purpose should prove to be threatened with failure, or when the enemy's troops are under the threat of utter defeat, it is possible that he will make the transition to the employment of nuclear weapons.

2. The Coastal Front is engaged in stubborn battles on the axes of the enemy's offensive, successfully repulsing the attacks of his forward units and the massed air raids. The first-echelon large units of the front attack groupings have begun a movement out of the departure areas toward the state border on a number of axes /and/ have crossed it with their forward units.

I decided that: the enemy's forward units that are attacking are to be defeated and their invasion repulsed through a stubborn defense by the covering units and large units, the fire of artillery and antitank means, and fighter-bomber and fire support helicopter strikes. In the event that the enemy offensive is developed on the invasion axes, the antitank defense of these axes is to be reinforced by drawing on the front and armies' antitank reserves.

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Following the fire destruction of the enemy, the attack groupings are to go over to the offensive on the previous axes. They are to destroy the advancing enemy groupings in a meeting engagement and by the close of 8 September the main forces are to seize the following line:

4th Army -- GLASHANDORF /sic -- GLESCHEENDORF/, BAD-  
SEGEBERG, (excluding) AHRENSBURG;  
7th Army -- UELZEN, ESCHEDI, WATHLINGEN;  
9th Army -- (excluding) WATHLINGEN, PEINE,  
BRAUNSCHWEIG.

Subsequently a rapid offensive is to be developed on the FLENSBURG axis -- enveloping /v obkhod/ HAMBURG from the north to NEUMUNSTER; and on the main attack axis -- to HANNOVER, and with part of the forces to SOLTAU and BODENWERDER.

The offensive is to start at 0900 hours 8 September.

The transition to the offensive by the first-echelon divisions of the front attack groupings is to be carried out /as they move/ through the battle formations of the covering units. Their offensive is to be supported from 1000 hours by the main forces of the fighter-bomber and army aviation of the 1st Air Army. At 1100 hours the bomber aviation is to be put into action to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons and aircraft on airfields, and to strike his reserves.

The tasks for the troops:

-- the decisions of the commanders of the 4th and 7th armies on the repulse of the enemy invasion and the transition to the offensive of their attack groupings are to be approved; furthermore, the commander of the 4th Army is not to allow the enemy to invade the cover sector of the 14th Motorized Rifle Division and is to make provision for the tank regiment of this division to take action in the area of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division;

-- the 9th Army, through a firm defense by its troops, is to repulse the invasion on the SALZGITTER-MAGDEBURG axis and repulse the invasion of units of the Blue 1st Army Corps;

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-- by the decisive offensive of /its/ main forces on the WOLFSBURG, LEHRTE axis in cooperation with the 7th Army, it is to destroy the offensive grouping of the Brown 1st Army Corps in a meeting engagement and by the close of 8 September the line (excluding) WATHLINGEN, PEINE, BRAUNSCHWEIG is to be seized;

-- the 1st Air Army is to provide air cover for the advance of the attack groupings of the front troops toward the state border and their transition to the offensive; after the delivery of the initial massed strike in the air operation the main forces of the fighter-bomber aviation are to support the combat actions of the advancing troops; the bomber aviation forces, in cooperation with the air forces of the Combined Baltic Fleet, are to destroy the enemy's nuclear attack means in the following areas: northeast of HAMBURG, north of GIPKHORN /sic -- GIFHORN/, and south of BRAUNSCHWEIG, as well as aircraft on the airfields according to reconnaissance data, and they are to strike the enemy's reserves; the fire support helicopters are to destroy tanks, armored personnel carriers, and fire means, concentrating their efforts on the HAMBURG and HANNOVER axes;

Front antitank reserve No. 2 -- the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade with mobile obstacle detachments No. 1 and No. 2 -- is to be ready to deploy on the following lines: OSTERBURG, BISMARCK and BEBERTAL, SEEHAUSEN with the task of not allowing enemy tanks to break through to STENDAL and MAGDEBURG.

Troop control in the repulse of the enemy invasion and in the transition of the strike groupings to the offensive is to be exercised from the forward command post of the front and armies.

4. Critique of the lesson -- 10 minutes

The lesson director announces the subject and training objectives of the lesson, notes the level of the students' preparation for the lesson and to what extent they have succeeded in achieving the assigned training objectives.

He gives instructions for eliminating the inadequacies that have been revealed and the assignment in preparation for the next lesson.

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